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the Shanghai Courts.
In the long term, prospects for greater
strengthening of national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities
Dispute Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent global financial crisis has called into question the
adequacy of financial institutions and dispute resolution at both the
national and supranational level.1 Although China has certainly been one
of the many nations to suffer from this crisis, it has fared relatively well.
However, it has not been completely immune from the fallout. Thus, it is
imperative that China's financial regulatory regime and systems of
financial dispute resolution be improved to meet the need for more
efficient financial structures.
This article will proceed as follows. First, Part II provides a
historical background of the development of China’s system of financial
governance. Part III proceeds with a more detailed discussion of the
current Chinese financial system, including a review of the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and
various financial dispute resolution cases handled by the Financial
Division of the Shanghai Courts. This article then examines possibilities
for financial governance sector reform. Part V concludes with the
suggestion that, for the near future parties can seek resolution through
institutions like the Shanghai Courts.

II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
China has made significant advancement in recent years with
respect to its systems of financial governance. This is apparent by
examining the historical development of its financial governance
mechanisms.
A. Before 1978:
Mechanisms

Limited

Financial

Dispute

Resolution

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in
1949, the Communist Party of China gradually moved toward a centrally
planned economy, similar to that of the Soviet Union.2 As a result of this
1

Hui Huang, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the
Global Financial Crisis, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 219 (2010).
2
Id. at 220.
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“Socialist Transformation” policy, private businesses became collectively
owned and eventually state-owned. 3 As the economy grew more
centralized, there was a decreased need for financial markets to fund
businesses and allocate resources.
Thus, the financial markets were slowly dismantled. In 1952, all
stock exchanges ceased operation, putting an end to the securities market.4
In 1959, the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC) was shut down,
which was quickly followed by a closure of the insurance market
altogether.5 Finally, the People's Bank of China (PBC) became the only
bank left in China that operated both as the central bank and a commercial
bank.6 Although the PBC provided the traditional services of saving and
lending, it functioned more as a governmental instrument rather than a
commercial bank.7 It was used primarily as a conduit through which state
money was channeled to fund state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In sum,
there was little to no financial regulation at the time.
Formal legal institutions were largely dissolved prior to 1978.
The official view was that “justice should not be separated artificially
from the masses of ordinary people by the barriers of lawyers, laws, and
law courts.”8 In contrast, “the people in their masses could judge and
decide questions of policy as well as the concrete disputes arising in
everyday life.” 9 Formal legal systems were not viewed as “flexible
enough to meet the needs of struggle under rapidly changing revolutionary
conditions,” 10 but rather as “an instrument for the oppression of
antagonistic classes.” 11 From 1949 to 1978, people’s mediation was
encouraged as the primary means of resolving civil and commercial
disputes. Focused on infusing Socialist ideology and reinforcing class

3

Id.
Id.
5
Linbo Fan, The Insurance Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GREATER
CHINA AREA: MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND HONG KONG SAR 157, 158 (Joseph J.
Norton et al. eds., 2000).
6
Huang, supra note 1, at 221.
7
Id.
8
YAN WANG, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: THE CASE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 22
(Routledge 2002).
9
RALPH H. FOLSOM, LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COMMENTARY, READINGS
AND MATERIALS 12 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds., 1989).
10
CARLOS WING-HUNG LO, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING: LEGAL THEORY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN DENG'S ERA 9 (1995).
11
Mao Zedong, On People’s Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 418 (1977).
4
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struggle,12 people's mediation became an informal means of promoting
“correct thought” (sixiang) in the context of resolving civil disputes.13
B. 1978–1992: Market Regulation and Dispute Resolution
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National People’s
Congress introduced an economic reform policy, marking an important
watershed in the development of China’s financial markets.14 First, the
banking system was reformed to keep up with the transition to a marketoriented economy.15 The “Big Four” state-owned banks were established
or reopened to provide specialized services, including the Agricultural
Bank of China (ABC) for the agricultural sector in February of 1979, the
Bank of China (BOC) for foreign exchange businesses in March of 1979,
the Construction Bank of China (CBOC) for big construction projects in
May of 1983, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
for taking over the commercial activities of the PBC in January of 1984.16
Banks were set up at both the national and local level, most of
which were jointly owned by the state and private investors.17 This was
done to increase market competition in the banking sector.18 In 1994,
three policy banks (the China Development Bank, the Agricultural
Development Bank of China, and the Export-Import Bank of China) were
set up to free the “Big Four” banks from the provision of policy loans,
enabling them to function as real commercial banks.19
Other aspects of the financial system also experienced significant
reforms. The securities market was revived in the early 1980s,
culminating in the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990 and 1991, respectively.20 Likewise, the
insurance market was brought to life with the reopening of the PICC in
1980 and the formation of more insurance companies thereafter.21

12

See Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in
Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284, 1306–09 (1967) (examining the political and
revolutionary function of mediation during the early years of Communist rule, focusing on
how disputes on a community wide basis were resolved).
13
Id.; see also 3 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 117–22 (1965) (stressing the
importance of the propagation of correct ideas and the correction of mistaken viewpoints
through rectification movements in Communist leadership).
14
Huang, supra note 1, at 221.
15
Id.
16
Yangxin Huang, The Banking Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE
GREATER CHINA AREA, supra note 5, at 25, 27–28.
17
Huang, supra note 1, at 221.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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As a consequence of the reform, the PBC took on a dual role in
financial regulation. First, it performed the major functions of the central
bank.22 Second, it supervised and regulated the entire financial system,
including banking, securities, and insurance.23 Thus, the PBC operated,
essentially, as the single financial regulator at the time.
In 1978, the flourishing of China’s market economy brought with
it the proliferation of both formal and informal legal institutions including
arbitral tribunals and mediation services. A number of new laws such as
the Laws on Economic Contracts, the Company Law and the Labor Laws
were developed to govern the development of China's market economy.24
In conjunction with the creation of a framework for direct foreign
investment, the role of agencies like the CIETAC was expanded.
A significant number of new laws were passed in the period from
1978 to 1981. During this time over 200 economic and commercial laws
were passed.25 The rationale for the proliferation of such laws was to
“regulate the relationships among different subjects in [the] market . . .
[and] promote harmonious economic development.”26 As a result of open
market policies, dispute resolution became less centralized. Reflecting
this change was the movement away from managerial dispute resolution
under a planned economy to increasingly decentralized, court-centered
litigation.27
As laws proliferated, so too did the need for legal institutions to
resolve an increasing number of disputes. In the period between 1990 and
1994, civil disputes—largely cases involving contract, property and tort
law matters—increased from 2.4 million to 3.5 million. 28 Decision
making devolved outside of factory managerial oversight committees to
external agencies such as CIETAC and regional arbitral bodies.
Alternative forms of dispute resolution continued to proliferate as
formal legal regulations multiplied. Mediation was to be conducted
according to the law as described in the Chinese Civil Procedures Code of

22

Id.
Id.
24
John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr., Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution
Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, 35 AM. J. COMP. L.
761, 773–76 (1987) (describing the increasing number of laws and economic policies
promulgated by China in the late 1970s and early 1980s).
25
Id. at 774.
26
To Establish the Legal Framework of Socialist Market Economy: Interveiw with Qiao
Shi, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Communist
Party Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, 1 CHINA LAW 8, 10 (1994).
27
Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q.
832, 862 (1997).
28
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE
OF LAW 30 (1997).
23

2011]

GOVERNING CHINA’S FINANCIAL DISPUTES

201

1991.29 In the mid-1980s, mediation helped to settle more than 90 percent
of civil cases30 and nearly 60 percent of civil cases were resolved in this
way by the late 1990s.31
C. 1992–Present: Multiple Sectors-based Regulators and the
Emergence of CIETAC
In the 1990s, China embraced financial regulation by sector,32
establishing separate regulators for banking, securities, and insurance.33
In April 1998, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
which had been founded in 1992, was vested with the exclusive authority
to regulate the securities market; 34 the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission (CIRC) was established in November 1998 in response to a
robust insurance market; and in April 2003, the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) took over the responsibility of direct banking
regulation from the PBC.
These three regulatory commissions, along with the PBC acting as
the central bank, constituted China’s financial regulatory framework, often
referred to as “yihang sanhui” (i.e., one bank, three commissions). This
model of regulation by sector reflects a policy commonly known as “fenye
jingying, fenye jianguan,” or “separate operation, separate regulation.”35
While in-court litigation continued to develop following the 1980s
Open Door Policy, arbitration institutions likewise developed an
expanding case load. The CIETAC has handled over 10,000 international
arbitration cases since it opened in 1956. More than 700 cases, largely

29

See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice:
The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25–27 (Margaret Woo & Mary Gallagher eds.,
2008) (describing the shift from adjudicatory justice to mediatory justice during Xiao
Yang’s tenure as President of the Supreme People’s Court).
30
Id. at 23.
31
LAW YEARBOOK CHINA (Zhongguo Falü Nianjian She 1983–1995).
32
See generally Huang, supra note 1 (noting the inadequacies of China’s traditional
sectoral system of financial regulation).
33
For a fuller discussion of the development of China’s financial reforms after its WTO
accession, see, e.g., FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM IN POST-WTO CHINA (James
Barth et al. eds., 2006).
34
HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING LAW IN CHINA 18–
19 (2006).
35
See Huang Hui (黄辉), Jinrong Jianguan Xiandai hua: Yingmei Faxi de Jingyan yu
Jiaoxun ( 金 融 监 管 现 代 化 ： 英 美 法 系 的 经 验 与 教 训 ) [Financial Regulatory
Modernization: Experiences and Lessons from the U.S. and UK Common Law
Jurisdictions] 1 GUANGDONG SHEHUI KEXUE (广东社会科学) 181, 185 (2009) (describing
the development of sector-based financial regulation in China).
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international in nature, are handled by CIETAC on an annual basis.36
Beyond in-court litigation and CIETAC arbitration, financial disputes may
be resolved through recourse to provincial arbitral bodies such as the
Shenzhen Arbitration Commission (SAC) and local mediation services.

III. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE IN
CHINA
Financial Regulatory Oversight
The PBC is responsible for monetary policy and market stability,
while the CBRC, the CSRC, and the CIRC are responsible for the
regulation of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, respectively.
These four regulatory bodies will be discussed infra seriatim.
The PBC is the central bank in China, as dictated by the Law on
the People’s Bank of China (PBC Law).37 The PBC’s mandate is to
formulate and implement monetary policies, guard against financial risks,
and maintain financial stability under the leadership of the State Council.38
Thus, the PBC performs three roles, which are common to most central
banks: (1) it issues currency (i.e., the Renminbi); (2) it operates as a
lender to banks; and (3) it operates as a bank to the government.39 Instead
of direct market intervention, the PBC seeks to stabilize the currency and
the financial system through indirect, macroeconomic means, such as
deposit reserves, the rediscount rate, interest rates, and open market
operations.40
The CBRC came into existence in 2003, assuming the monitoring
responsibilities of the PBC. The Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks41
and the Law of the PRC on Banking Regulation and Supervision42 govern

36

China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, BIZCHINANOW (Mar.
11, 2001, 2:09 PM),
http://bizchinanow.com/Contents/Channel_1847/2007/0828/60510/content_60510.htm.
37
Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fa (中国人民银行法) [Law on the People’s Bank of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 18, 1995, effective Mar. 18, 1995,
amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Dec. 27,
2003), art. 2 (China).
38
Id.
39
See id. art. 4. It should be noted that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange is a
government agency under the leadership of the PBC and it acts as the implementation
branch of the PBC in relation to foreign exchange administration and supervision.
40
Zhongguo Renmin Yinghang Fa, supra note 37, art. 23.
41
Shangye Yinhang Fa (商业银行法) [Law on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, amended by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003) (China).
42
Yinhang Ye Jiandu Guanli Fa ( 银 行 业 监 督 管 理 法 ) [Law on Regulation and
Administration on Banking Industry] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
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the CBRC, which operates as a ministry unit under leadership of the State
Council. The CIRC was established in 1998 under the Insurance Law of
the PRC.43 The CIRC regulates market conduct within the insurance
sector. The Securities Law of the PRC (Securities Law) set up the
regulatory framework for the securities market.44 Established in 1992, the
CSRC, which is responsible for securities regulation in China, is the oldest
of the three sector-specific regulatory bodies. The Securities Law’s scope
is expansive, authorizing the CSRC to regulate all financial instruments,
including equities, bonds, and derivative instruments.45
Resolution of Financial Disputes
Within the various sectors described above, dedicated financial
dispute resolution can be conducted through CIETAC or the courts.46 In
the sections that follow, these schemes will be described alongside a
detailed case analysis of the types of cases handled by these bodies.
A. Institutional Arbitration—CIETAC
Within China, arbitration continues to be among the more favored
mechanisms for financial dispute resolution.47 Institutional arbitration is
the sole option for disputants as ad hoc arbitration has no legal standing
according to Chinese law.48 Therefore, parties to an arbitration in China
will be required to select a recognized domestic arbitral institution and
select the specific arbitration format from among those listed on the
institution’s rosters.

Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China).
43
Baoxian Fa (保险法) [Insurance Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Jun. 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995, amended by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003, amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 9 (China).
44
Zhengquan Fa (证券法) [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, amended by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004, amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan.1, 2006) (China).
45
Id. art. 2.
46
See Dispute Avoidance and Dispute Resolution, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/riskmanagement/eg_cn_028283.asp
(explaining
the primary methods of avoiding and resolving disputes in China).
47
Shoushuang Li, Insight into Commercial Dispute Resolution in China, HONG KONG
LAWYER (Jan. 2004), http://www.hk-lawyer.com/InnerPages_features/0/1068/2004/1.
48
Id.
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1. Chinese Arbitration Commissions

China is home to a large number of arbitral organizations. Among
the most prominent is the China International Trade and Arbitration
Commission (hereinafter CIETAC). Largely handling commercial and
economic cases, CIETAC most recently in 2003 adoped a set of Rules
pertaining to Financial Dispute Arbitration which covers disputes between
parties arising in connection with financial transactions.49 Plans are under
way to further develop the rules for financial disputes and proposals for
such provisions have been solicited.50
The mission of CIETAC since its founding in 1956 has been to
provide a forum for resolving economic and trade related disputes.51 In
addition to its central location in Beijing it has branch offices located
throughout China including Tianjin, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Its
headquarters in Tianjin are know as the CIETAC Financial Arbitration
Center.52 At present, there are over twenty-one branch offices serving the
needs of various business sectors in China. Each branch is governed by a
secretariat which helps coordinate the activities and cases handled within
each branch.53
Beyond CIETAC, more than 140 provincial arbitration
commissions operate in over 140 cities including Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Beijing and Shenzhen.54 Of these commissions, a large number have also
established financial arbitration services in response to the growing need
for a forum to handle banking-related disputes. For example, a large
number of such commissions, primarily those located in financial centers
such as Shanghai, established financial arbitration commissions beginning
in 2007. Later similar programs were established in Chongqing,
Hangzhou, Guangdong and Wuhan.55 Such centers have been established
49

Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission, revised and adopted by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce on Mar. 17,
2005, effective May 1, 2005) CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION
COMMISSION,
art.
1,
available
at
http://www.cietac.org/index/rules/47607aa1ab746c7f001.cms.
50
See Guanyu Xiuding “Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuan Hui Zhongcai
Guize” Zhengxun Yijian de Tongzhi (关于修订《中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规
则 》 征 询 意 见 的 通 知 ),
CIETAC
(Dec.
7,
2009),
http://cn.cietac.org/NewsFiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=896 (Chinese) (calling for
submission of comments and suggestions to the CIETAC Arbitration institute).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
EXPORT.GOV, supra note 46.
55
See Jiang Yaya, Liu Ying & Lu Yibo (蒋娅娅，刘颖 & 陆一波), Shanghai Jinrong
Zhongcai Yuan Chengli (上海金融仲裁院成立) [Establishment of the Shanghai Financial
Arbitration Commission], SHANGHAI ZHONGCAI FA YANJIU ZHONGXIN (上海仲裁法研究中
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to provide a space for citizens to seek out assistance when faced with
abusive practices by banking institutions.56 The Shenzhen Arbitration
Commission has also recently developed a similar financial arbitration
service.57
2. Financial Dispute Resolution System Through CIETAC
CIETAC, beyond helping to resolve a large number of
commercial and economic cases, has established a financial dispute
resolution mechanism to handle banking-related disputes within China. It
has established a set of Rules which aim to provide speedy and competent
case handling for financial related disputes.
3. Examining CIETAC’s Financial Arbitration Rules
CIETAC issued the “China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules”
(hereinafter the Rules) in March of 2005. These rules came into force on
May 1, 2005, after being revised by the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce. The
Rules were created in order to facilitate the “impartial and prompt
resolution of disputes arising from financial transactions between the
parties.”58 The scope of disputes covered by the Rules include those
“arising from, or in connection with, financial transactions between the
parties.”59 “Financial transactions” are defined as:
transactions arising between financial institutions inter se,
or arising between financial institutions and other natural
or legal persons in the currency, capital, foreign exchange,
gold and insurance markets that relate to financing in both
心 ) [SHANGHAI ARBITRATION LAW RESEARCH CENTER] (Dec. 19, 2007),
http://www.arsh.sjtu.edu.cn/view_news.jsp?newsid=77 (Chinese) (announcing the
inauguration of the Shanghai Financial Arbitration Court).
56
Yu Chengli Xibu Shoujia Jinrong Zhongcai Yuan, Shu Guonei Di Er Zhuanmen Jigou
(渝成立西部首家金融仲裁院, 属国内第2专门机构) [The Establishment of the First
Arbitration Institution in the West of China, Chongqing, the Second-largest Specialized
Institution
in
the
Country],
CHONGQING
DAILY
(July
29,
2010),
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/business/2010-07/29/content_20471602.htm (Chinese).
57
Shenzhen Jinrong Zhongcai Yuan Jianjie (深圳金融仲裁院简介) [Introduction to the
Shenzhen Financial Arbitration Commission], SHENZHEN ZHONGCAI WEIYUAN HUI (深圳
仲 裁 委 员 会 ) [SHENZHEN ARBITRATION COMMISSION] (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.fabao365.com/news/657785.html (Chinese).
58
Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules, supra note 49.
59
Id. art. 2.
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domestic and foreign currencies, and the assignment and
sale of financial instruments and documents denominated
in both domestic and foreign currencies . . . .60

When bringing a dispute under the Rules, disputants must specify
whether they intend to use mediation or arbitration. If arbitration is
selected under the Rules and no institution is specified, then the
assumption is that the parties intended CIETAC.61 Therefore, CIETAC is
among the most frequently used institutions for the resolution of financial
disputes.
In addition to permitting parties to specify their selected method
and location for the resolution of financial disputes, the Rules permit them
to select an arbitrator from a specialized Panel comprised of experts
within the financial industry. The final approval of the arbitrators rests
with the CIETAC Chairman. Parties may also select the number of
arbitrators (either one or three) and where parties have not made a prior
determination, the CIETAC Chairman will make a determination
according to Article 12. The specialized financial arbitration panel is
comprised of over 100 individuals from diverse backgrounds including
experts from Canada, the United States, EU countries including France,
the UK and the Netherlands, as well as mainland China, Macau SAR and
HKSAR. Many of these panel members have expertise in finance as well
as Banking Law, Arbitration Law, Company Law and Contracts.
When determining the final award, the Panel will look to the
language of the contract, industry standards, and principles of
reasonableness and fairness. In some cases, foreign law may be selected
as the substantive law of the arbitration if the case involves a foreign
element. However, the final selection of the substantive law to be applied
rests with the arbitral tribunal. In the event that a particular case or issue
is not covered by the Financial Arbitration Rules, then reference will be
made to the general CIETAC Arbitration Rules.
With respect to the issuance of the final award, Article 12 of the
Rules states that the award is to be issued within 45 days from the
constitution of the tribunal, unless the parties agree otherwise. This period
may be extended by up to 20 days as needed with the consent of the
Secretary-General.

60
61

Id.
Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules, supra note 49.
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a. First Case Accepted by CIETAC Tianjin International
Economic and Financial Arbitration Center
The
CIETAC
Tianjin
International Economic
and
Financial Arbitration Center accepted its first case in 2008.62 The case
involved a nine million yuan sale of goods dispute. The Tianjin office
was set up to serve Tianjin’s rapidly developing financial sector in
providing a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes.
b. Recent CIETAC Financial and Commercial Dispute
Resolution Cases
Below is a selection of CIETAC’s recent financial and
commercial cases. What can be observed from these cases is the
following: most all of the cases involve issues relating to the sale of
goods, capital contributions, lease contracts, etc. As a result, CIETAC has
had limited exposure to banking related cases. Nevertheless, for the cases
it has handled, it has achieved a relatively uniform process of case
handling through reference to commercial agreements, existing law, and
trade practice.
i. Dispute over Capital Contribution in a Joint Venture
(Published 2009)63
One case involved a dispute between two parties who signed an
agreement to establish a limited liability entertainment company. The
contract required both parties to contribute capital, including a one-time
payment of registered capital made within five months of acquiring the
necessary license to conduct business. The claimant alleged that the
respondent was unable to fulfill its obligations because the property it
intended to provide as capital belonged to the government of the district
where the joint venture was located and the government had already
mortgaged it to a bank. The respondent counterargued that the claimant
had not fully contributed the amount of capital required by the contract:
the foreign exchange that it had originally promised to contribute was not
paid and the equipment provided fell short of the required amount.
62

Maozhong Tianjin Guoji Jingji Jinrong Zhongcai Zhongxin Shouli Diyi An (贸仲天津国
际经济金融仲裁中心受理第一案) [The First Case Accepted by Tianjin International
Economic and Financial CIETAC Arbitration Center], TIANJIN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL ARBITRATION CENTER OF THE CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
TRADE
ARBITRATION
COMMISSION
(Dec.
10,
2008),
http://www.cietactj.org/newsfiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=45.
63
Dispute Over Capital Contribution in a Joint Venture, CIETAC (July 15, 2009),
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/cases/47603791dea0167f001.cms.
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According to the terms of the contract, the claimant referred the
matter to CIETAC for arbitration. The arbitral tribunal found that the
respondent did not have legal rights to the property that was to be used as
its capital contribution and hence did not carry its investment obligations.
The claimant also did not completely execute its investment obligations
under the terms of the contract. Therefore, the tribunal determined that
the joint venture contract should be terminated and the claimant’s requests
for compensation should be rejected.
Here, the subject matter of the dispute—a capital contribution
agreement—was more commercial, rather than financial, in nature. The
case determination was made primarily on the basis of the terms of the
contract. Therefore, parties are advised to consider such terms carefully,
in light of future adjudication.
ii. Dispute over a Contract for the Sale of Goods—Contract
Revision and Reserving the Right to Seek Compensation for
Damages (Published 2009)64
Another case involved a dispute between the claimant and
respondent French company, who signed a contract for the sale of glass
production equipment which the claimant intended for resale to its partner
companies in China in February 1996. The contract required the claimant
buyer to open an irrevocable letter of credit for the full contract price with
the respondent seller 60 days before loading. The claimant opened a letter
of credit as required by the contract but the respondent failed to deliver the
equipment according to schedule. When the respondent finally delivered
the equipment one and a half months later, the claimant demanded that the
respondent pay penalties according to the contract for late delivery of
goods, and sought additional compensation on the basis that the
respondent’s late delivery had caused the claimant to violate its resale
contracts with its partner companies as well as the cost of altering the
letter of credit. The claimant argued that revision of the letter of credit
was independent of the main contract and therefore it did not amount to
revision of the contract, while the respondent argued that the revision of
the letter of credit extended the original date of delivery in the contract.
The arbitral tribunal found that although the letter of credit existed
independently of the main body of the contract, it still originated from the
contract. Generally speaking, revision of the major articles of a contract,
such as the date of delivery of goods, should be viewed as equivalent to
the revision of the contract itself. A party may agree to revise a letter of
credit with or without conditions, but it should protect its right to seek
64

Dispute Over a Contract for the Sale of Goods―Contract Revision and Reserving the
Right to Seek Compensation for Damages, CIETAC (July 15, 2009),
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/cases/47603791dcfea17f001.cms.

2011]

GOVERNING CHINA’S FINANCIAL DISPUTES

209

compensation by expressly reserving its right to seek compensation later
based on the provisions of the contract. If a party seeks to revise a letter
of credit without reservation, it abandons its right to seek compensation in
the future. Therefore, the claimant lost its contractual right to seek
compensation from respondent based on late delivery of goods, as the
respondent delivered the equipment within the time limit set by the
revised letter of credit.
Here CIETAC primarily considered the parties initial and
subsequent revisions to its contract and reasoned that revision to the letter
of credit (LOC) without conditions amounted to a change in the
underlying contract itself and therefore that the claimant was not entitled
to damages.
iii. Lease Contract Dispute—Obvious Loss of Fairness and
Exercise of the Right to Revoke a Contract (Published
2009)65
The claimant, a Hong Kong citizen, and the respondent, a Beijingbased real estate company, signed a contract in 1996 where the claimant
agreed to lease to the respondent its property in Beijing. Before the
contract was signed, the respondent agreed to sublet the property to a
department store. According to the contract, if the rent obtained by the
respondent from subletting the property exceeded a certain minimum
amount, the respondent could claim the remainder, and if the rent fell
under the minimum amount, the respondent was required to pay the
remainder to the claimant. In 1999, the claimant applied to CIETAC for
arbitration on the basis that the respondent failed to pay the required
amount of rent. The respondent argued that the sum it was required to pay
by the contract far exceeded the amount of rent it obtained from the
sublease, therefore the contract had lost its fairness under Article 5 of the
Contract Law of PRC and should be revoked.
The arbitral tribunal found that, as the contract contained explicit
provisions regarding the calculation and payment of rent, the respondent
still had the obligation to pay the minimum required rent to the claimant
regardless of how much rent the respondent obtained from the sublease.
When the respondent signed the lease contract with the claimant, it had
already agreed to sublet the property for a third party for an amount less
than the rent it would have to pay to the claimant so the respondent was
clearly aware of the price differential. Also according to Articles 54 and
55 of the Contract Law, if a contract loses equality, a party has the right to
request that the court or arbitral tribunal permit modification or revocation
65

Lease Contract Dispute―Obvious Loss of Fairness and the Exercise of the Right to
Revoke a Contract, CIETAC (July 15, 2009).
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of the contract within one year of when it knew or should have known that
it had cause to do so. As the respondent did not attempt to exercise its
right until three years after signing the contract, the respondent had lost its
right to seek revocation even if the contract had actually become unfair.
This case, which involved a lease and sublease agreement,
primarily revolved around the running of a limitations time period.
Because the respondent waited until three years after signing the contract,
he lost his right to seek revocation.
iv. Execution of Duties of a Contract for the International
Sale of Goods66
The claimant seller and the respondent buyer signed a contract
under which the claimant agreed to supply the respondent with five
thousand tons of peanuts. The contract required the buyer to open an
irrevocable, transferable letter of credit with the seller as beneficiary
fifteen days before the loading date. The respondent failed to open a letter
of credit and cancelled the contract on the ground that there was
insufficient time to arrange the loading of the ship. The claimant sought
compensation for damages. The respondent’s failure to open the letter of
credit and arrange shipping forced the claimant to convert the product into
peanut oil, resulting in financial losses. The respondent counterargued
that examination of the goods before the loading period indicted that the
product did not meet the required standard and hence it did not open a
letter of credit.
The arbitral tribunal confirmed the claimant’s request for
compensation resulting from the respondent’s fundamental breach of
contract from failing to open the letter of credit. Regardless of the
claimant’s usual practice to open a letter of credit only after the parties
examined the product together and determined the required standard was
met, contractual obligations will always supersede an implicit
understanding.
Here CIETAC relied first on the contract as stated, as opposed to
industry practice. Because the opening of a letter of credit was not
contingent on product quality, the respondent was contractually bound to
open the letter of credit. As he failed to do so, he was in breach of the
contract.

66

Problem in the Sequence of the Execution of Duties in a Contract for the International
Sale of Goods, CIETAC (July 16, 2009), http://www.cietac.org/index.cms.
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c. Assessment of Cases
As can be seen from the above sample of CIETAC cases, the
majority of those cited deal with some variation of a contractual dispute,
whether it be for the sale of goods, the opening of a letter of credit,
subleasing agreements or product quality. None of the cases reviewed
above directly involve banking- or financing-related disputes. While
CIETAC maintains a list of highly qualified and well established financial
dispute resolution practitioners, given the limited number of finance
related cases thus far referred to CIETAC, a question arises as to the
preparation of CIETAC on the whole to handle financial- and bankingrelated matters.
Why might the number of financial dispute resolution cases
brought to CIETAC be low? In general, CIETAC is among the most well
known arbitral institutions in China and the first to introduce a financial
dispute resolution system. Therefore, it is not the lack of awareness or the
absence of a specialized program that has deterred users. One reason
might be that CIETAC case handling fees are less expensive when
compared with other international arbitration venues, but relative to
general income levels in China, CIETAC fees can still be high. As a
result, case fees may serve as a deterrent to midsize businesses and sole
proprietorships.
B. Shanghai Courts—Financial Division
The Shanghai Courts have handled a wider range and larger
number of financial and banking related cases than CIETAC. As will be
seen below, the Shanghai Courts have had more extensive experience
handling financial and corporate claims.
Case Handling
A recent study conducted by the Shanghai High Court analyzed
the case intake and disposition of financial-related cases.67 The study
found that the Court handled over 1,165 financial criminal cases in 2010
(an increase of 38.3 percent from the previous year), and 22,278 financial
and commercial civil cases (an increase of 29.6 percent from the previous
year). The total case value exceeded 6.4 billion RMB. The civil cases
involved loan agreements, insurance contracts, securities, financial leasing

67

Woyuan Juxing Xilie Shenpan Baipishu Fabu Hui (我院举行系列审判白皮书发布会)
[Press Conference on the Issue of White Papers], SHANGHAI NO.2 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE’S
COURT, http://www.shezfy.com/view.html?id=55150 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
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arrangements, credit cards and trust funds, while the criminal cases
involved issues such as credit card fraud, bill fraud and sales.68
Relevant Cases
Below is a sample of relevant cases handled by the Financial
Division of the Shanghai Courts. The sample illustrates the growing depth
and breadth of experience in handling financial-related issues and the use
of mediation in some cases.
1. Abuse of Majority Shareholder Power (Published 2008)69
This case involved a plaintiff and defendant who were originally
the only two shareholders in a company with registered capital of 21
million RMB, respectively holding 15 percent and 85 percent stakes.
Under the pretext of addressing company liquidity problems, the
defendant, who was also the majority shareholder, held several
shareholder meetings between April and September 2005 to approve the
injection of capital by itself and a third party “strategic partner” company.
The capital injection allowed the defendant to increase his stake in the
company to 73.7 percent and the third party “strategic partner” company
obtained 20 percent while the minority shareholder’s stake was reduced to
6.3 percent. The plaintiff sued the defendant for abuse of the position of
majority shareholder.
The appellate court, in consideration of the deteriorated
relationship between the two parties, persuaded them to reach a mediation
agreement where the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff’s entire
equity interest and pay the plaintiff a one-off compensation of 6.1 million
RMB.

68

Ying Yilin (应一琳), Xinyong Ka Zhapian Cheng Jinrong Fanzui Zhongzai Qu (信用卡
诈骗成金融犯罪重灾区 ) [Credit Card Fraud Becomes the Most Common Financial
Crime],
SHANGHAI
BUSINESS
DAILY
(Mar.
11,
2011),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110311/11109512831.shtml.
69
Dong Li yu Shanghai Zhida Jianshe Fazhan Youxian Gongsi deng Gudong Lanyong
Gudong Quanli Peichang Jiufen Shangsu An (董力与上海致达建设发展有限公司等股东
滥用股东权利赔偿纠纷上诉案) [Appeal on Dispute Between Dong Li and Shanghai
Zhida Jianshe Fazhan Co., Ltd. and Other Shareholders Over Compensation for the Abuse
of Majority Shareholder Power], SHANGHAI NO.2 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE’S COURT (Sept. 3,
2008), http://www.shezfy.com/view/jpa/detail.html?id=175 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
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2. Request for Winding Up of Company (Published 2006)70
This case involved a claim by plaintiff subsidiary company
against the defendant parent company. The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant parent company refused to hold shareholder and director
meetings resulting in severe difficulties in the management and normal
operation of the company.
After a review of the facts, the court held for the defendant,
indicating that the plaintiffs should also bear responsibility for the
unfavourable state of management of the company which was partly
attributed to their breach of contract.
3. Fraudulent Shareholder Investment71
One case involved a joint venture agreement entered into by two
defendants in June 1999. Although the official registration records
indicated that the company had registered capital of 5 million RMB, the
two defendant shareholders had in fact paid nothing. In 2004, the
company increased its registered investment capital to 10 million RMB,
with the two shareholder’s funding obligations still unfulfilled. A debt
crisis hit the company and the suppliers, bank and other debtors sued the
company and its two shareholders.
The court held that shareholders were required to pay the full
contribution in order to set up a company. As the company’s actual
capital was below that of the legal minimum, its corporate status was not
established and the defendant shareholders were, as a result, jointly and
severally liable for the company’s debts.

70

Shanghai Boxing Jiyin Xinpian Youxian Zeren Gongsi, Shanghai Bode Jiyin Kaifa
Youxian Gongsi, Bohai yu Shanghai Sanmao Qiye (Jituan) Gufen Youxian Gongsi deng
Gudong Qingqiu Jiesan Gongsi Jiufen An (上海博星基因芯片有限责任公司、上海博德
基因开发有限公司、董海与上海三毛企业（集团）股份有限公司等股 东请求解散公
司纠纷案) [Dispute Over (Shareholders’) Request to Dissolve the Company] (Sept. 8,
2006),
SHANGHAI
NO.2
INTERMEDIATE
PEOPLE’S
COURT,
http://www.shezfy.com/view/jpa/detail.html?id=111 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
71
Eight cases on financial and investment risks were heard by the Shanghai High Court on
September 19, 2010. See Gao Yuan (高远), Shanghai Gaoyuan Tongbao Baqi Fengxian
Jingshi Anli (上海高院通报8起风险警示案例) [Shanghai High Court Report on 8
Typical Cases on Financial and Investment Risks], SHANGHAI FINANCIAL NEWS (Oct. 12,
2010,
1:17
AM)
http://www.shfinancialnews.com/xww/2009jrb/node5019/node5036/node5048/userobject1
ai66151.html (discussing eight companies involved in litigation in the Shanghai Higher
People’s Court).
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4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Management72

This case involved a dispute between a defendant manager for a
foreign company responsible for the company’s sales in the South China
region and the foreign company. In the course of his employment, the
defendant obtained profits for himself through side dealing and fraudulent
means. The company dismissed the defendant and sued him for
compensation of losses suffered by the company.
The court held that the defendant owed duties of loyalty
(including a prohibition against self-dealing) to the company. As a result
of the defendant’s breach, the court ordered him to disgorge any profits
and compensate the company for the losses it suffered.
5. Company Refusal to Award Shareholder Dividends
This case involved a dispute between a shareholder (the plaintiff)
and his company (the defendant). In January 2008, the plaintiff was
arrested and held in custody for a crime that he was subsequently
acquitted of. During the period of custody, the defendant company
distributed shareholder dividends for the year of 2007 to all shareholders
except the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought a payment of his dividends after
his release.
The court held that shareholder rights are not affected even when
a shareholder is under custody by the police. The defendant was ordered
to pay the plaintiff his dividends accordingly.
6. Company Deregistration Prior to Liquidation
This case involved a plaintiff real estate company, which was set
up in 1999 and deregistered in March 2006. During the period when the
company was in operation, it purchased 0.5 million RMB worth of
construction materials from the defendant, which remained unpaid at the
time of deregistration.
The court held that, even after a company is deregistered and
wound up, the shareholders are still under the responsibility to liquidate
the company according to law. The court ordered the shareholders to
compensate the defendant for any losses suffered due to the non-payment
for the materials.73

72

Id.
Song Xuan (宋璇), Weiji Xia Shanghai Jinrong Anjian Jizeng (危机下上海金融案件激
增) [Surge in Financial Litigation as Financial Crisis Hits Shanghai], PEOPLE.COM.CN,
(May 21, 2009), http://paper.people.com.cn/gjjrb/html/2009-05/21/content_257709.htm.
73
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C. Summary
From a review of the case intake of the Financial Division, it is
clear that the Shanghai Courts have extensive exposure to financial related
cases. 74 Overall, given its low case intake fees in comparison with
CIETAC and its more extensive case exposure, it would appear that in the
short term, parties may be best served by reference to specialized financial
court dispute resolution mechanisms, while in the long term, as arbitral
bodies gain greater exposure to financial- and banking-related disputes,
such mechanisms will provide additional viable options for disputing
parties in the future.

IV. LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
What lessons can be learned from the global financial crisis?
How can such lessons be applied to the development of China’s financial
governance systems in the future? Although China’s financial markets
and institutions have been affected by the global financial crisis, the
impact appears less direct and less severe than is the case with overseas
markets.75 The Chinese financial system as a whole has survived the crisis
in relatively good shape: no major financial institutions have fallen and
no major scandals over transactions involving complex financial products
have occurred. The losses suffered by Chinese financial institutions are
essentially the consequence of their ill-fated investment in and exposure to
overseas markets rather than domestic markets. Further, the overall risk
exposure of China’s financial institutions and listed companies in overseas
markets is quite limited and manageable.
However, one would be wrong to conclude, judging from the
relatively good health of the Chinese financial markets following the
financial crisis, that China’s financial regulatory system is problem-free.
Rather, a closer examination reveals the irony that the good fortune of
China’s financial system in this financial crisis is largely attributable to
the relative simplicity of its financial products and isolation from the
global economy.
To begin with, the Chinese financial markets continue to have
much room for development. At present, the financial products traded on
the Chinese financial markets are limited and the technology of
securitization is yet to be widely used. There are some traditional
financial derivatives in China such as options and warrants, but they are
74

See Shanghai Fayuan Falü Wenshu Jiansuo Zhongxin (上海法院法律文书检索中心),
http://www.hshfy.sh.cn:8081/flws/list.jsp (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (listing cases that
have been adjudicated by the Shanghai Courts).
75
Hui Huang, China’s Legal Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: From Domestic
Reform to International Engagement, 12 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 157.
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far fewer than those found in overseas markets and far less sophisticated
than their overseas counterparts, including collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and synthetic CDOs. As
securitization and complex financial instruments have now been identified
as one of the core causes of the current financial crisis,76 it is not hard to
understand why China’s financial system has not suffered any homegrown
problems.
On the other hand, the isolation of the Chinese financial system
from the outside world has helped to stop the flow-on effect of the
financial crisis in China. Although China has worked to open up its
financial markets since its accession to the WTO, this process has been
gradual, cautious, and ongoing. For the time being, foreigners have
limited access to the Chinese financial markets. For example, foreign
investors cannot trade in China’s stock market except through several
designated means such as the program for Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors (QFII). 77 Further, the Chinese government still exerts tight
control over its currency policy. For instance, there are restrictions on
capital accounts; the Chinese currency, the Renminbi or yuan, is not fully
convertible yet; the exchange rate is set in a managed floating range.78 All
these measures have collectively operated as a firewall to insulate China’s
financial system from the spills of the financial crisis overseas.
China can take some comfort from the fact that its financial
system has sustained relatively modest losses in the current financial crisis.
However, it should not be overjoyed about its lucky escape, overlooking
the real problems it has faced. As observed by the People’s Bank’s
Governor, the fault of the previous crisis was “not in the technical
sophistication of the products” 79 but rather arose from “problems in
information disclosure or the pricing mechanisms.” 80 Others have
observed that the technology of securitization and financial derivatives, if
76

See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law Sch.,
Keynote Address of the Third Annual Supreme Court/Law Society Conference on
Corporate Law 2008: Financial Crises 101: What Can We Learn from Scandals and
Meltdowns—from
Enron
to
Subprime?
(Aug.
2008),
available
at
http://sydney.edu.au/law/news/docs_pdfs_images/2008/2008RossParsonsAddressPodcast.
mp3.
77
See HUI HUANG, supra note 34, at 12–13 (describing the QFII mechanism and other
means for foreigners to invest in China’s stock market).
78
See China to Make RMB Convertible on Capital Account in 5 Years, CHINA DAILY (Jan.
19, 2011, 9:28 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201101/19/content_11878739.htm (discussing China’s plan to make its currency convertible on
the capital account).
79
LEO F. GOODSTADT, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: HOW THE WEST CREATED AND HOW
CHINA SURVIVED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 12 (2011).
80
Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor, People’s Bank of China, Instability and the Evolution of the
Financial System, Speech at the Global Management Forum (Oct. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r071213a.pdf?frames=0.
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used and regulated properly, can make the market more efficient and
effective.81 China is thus best advised to further develop its financial
markets by investigating the applicability of such financial tools, while at
the same time strengthening its regulatory system to avoid abuse.
What is required is a more effective regulatory framework that can
take on the increasingly complex challenge of providing coordinated
supervision of innovative financial products and multi-service financial
groups. This challenge has been acknowledged worldwide, as U.S.
federal regulators now admit in relation to the most recent financial crisis
that “neither the investors, nor the rating agencies, nor the regulators, nor
even the firms that designed the securities fully appreciated the risks those
securities entailed . . . in part because the regulators—like most financial
firms and investors—did not fully understand or appreciate them.”82
As discussed earlier, China presently adopts a traditional sectoral
system of financial regulation, which has exhibited several inadequacies in
meeting the regulatory challenges in a rapidly changing market. This
author has discussed the issue elsewhere through a comparative analysis
of the relevant experiences in some advanced economies including the
U.S., the UK and Australia. Each of these jurisdictions represents a
different regulatory approach, namely the ‘multiple-regulators’ model or
‘sectoral regulation’ model in the U.S., the ‘single-regulator’ model or
‘integrated regulation’ model in the UK, and the ‘twin peaks’ model or
‘objectives-based regulation’ model in Australia. When looking to
overseas regulatory models for guidance, one must take into account not
only the advantages and disadvantages in doing so, but also of the local
conditions in China. This author suggests that “the U.S. model merits
consideration in the short term, [and that] with further growth of China’s
financial markets in the long run the Australian model provides the
preferred direction for reform.”83
With regard to China’s systems of financial dispute resolution,
following the financial crisis, China saw the emergence of CIETAC’s
financial dispute resolution mechanism. However the use of this
mechanism has been minimal. Why might that be? In general, CIETAC
is amongst the most well known arbitral institutions in China and the first
to introduce a financial dispute resolution system. Therefore, it is not the
81

See generally Christina A. Johnson, At the Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives:
Who Has the Right of Way?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing securitization and
derivative transactions); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1991) (discussing
securitization's role in broadening borrower access to the capital markets and reducing
borrowing costs).
82
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Dallas Regional Chamber,
Economic
Challenges:
Past,
Present,
and
Future
(Apr.
7
2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100407a.pdf.
83
Huang, supra note 1, at 254.
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lack of awareness or the absence of a specialized program that has
deterred users: one reason might be that while CIETAC case handling
fees are less expensive when compared with other international arbitration
venues, CIETAC fees in domestic cases can be high.84 As a result, case
fees may potentially cost out midsize businesses. A sliding scale fee for
midsize businesses may make CIETAC financial arbitration more
attractive for such entities. In addition, because pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in standard form contracts can be held invalid in a number of
circumstances under the PRC Law,85 this presents an additional barrier to
CIETAC use by small and midsize businesses. It is possible to “tick the
box” to select arbitration, but in practice, few people choose to do this.
Therefore, greater awareness is needed among small businesses regarding
the benefits of arbitration as well as a commensurate sliding scale fee to
make the arbitration process more accessible.

84

See
Arbitration
Fee
Schedule,
CIETAC
http://www.cietac.org/index/applicationForArbitration/47601fd5a0e7e87f001.cms (listing
a schedule of fees charged for cases accepted for arbitration based on the amount in
dispute) (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
85
See Application by Qiu Donglan and Wu Feng for Confirming Validity of an Arbitration
Agreement (Kunming Interm. Ct., First Civil Div. Jan. 21, 2009) (initial ruling, Case
No.1); see also Kunming Intermediate People's Court Civil Ruling (上海高院通报8起风
险
警
示
案
例
)
CHINALAWINFO
(2009),
http://fjthk.now.cn:7751/vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=1175
99234 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) (discussing the hearing for Qiu Donglan and Wu Feng).
In that case, the applicants and the respondents were parties to a contract for sale and
purchase of commodity housing, of which Article 14 was a standard arbitration clause
submitting the dispute to Kunming Arbitration Commission. Although the Court held that
Article 14 was valid, it suggested that a standard arbitration clause could be invalidated if
there was evidence indicating that:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

the scope of the arbitration agreement exceeded that permitted by law,
any of the parties concerned was incapable of concluding the
arbitration agreement, or the agreement was obtained by coercion
(Art. 17 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC);
the arbitrable matters and the choice arbitration commission were not
clearly specified (Art. 18 the Arbitration Law of the PRC);
the arbitration agreement excluded the liabilities of the party
supplying the agreement, increased the liabilities of the other party, or
deprived the other party of any of its material rights (Art. 40 of the
Contract Law of the PRC);
the agreement was obtained by fraud or duress, the parties colluded in
bad faith, the parties intended to conceal an illegal purpose, the
agreement was harmful to the public interest, or the agreement
violated any law or administrative regulation (Art. 52 of the Contract
Law of the PRC);
the agreement excluded liabilities for personal injury or liabilities for
property loss caused by intentional misconduct or gross negligence
(Art. 53 of the Contract Law of the PRC).
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Despite handling a limited number of cases, CIETAC has been
generally effective in providing a forum for the resolution of commercial
disputes, while its hearing of financial-related disputes continues to have
much scope for growth. In order to further strengthen CIETAC’s role in
providing a venue for the resolution of financial related disputes, there is a
need to provide further training to arbitrators so that they become well
versed in financial systems, laws and regulations.86 In addition, CIETAC
may consider drafting a general model clause for use in financial product
sales contracts. This will make CIETAC a more attractive venue of the
resolution of financial disputes.
On the other hand, the Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts
has had extensive exposure to financial and commercial cases. It has
handled more than 260,000 civil and financial-related cases.87 Comparing
case intake and exposure with that of CIETAC, it is clear that the
Shanghai Courts have developed extensive familiarity with financial
related disputes.
With respect to both CIETAC and the Financial Division of the
Shanghai Courts, further training and development is necessary. It is
suggested that a comprehensive financial dispute resolution training
program consider the inclusion of both a course-based program followed
by an examination and an in-person evaluation program. The course
content could include topics such as the arbitration process, ethical
considerations, how to determine potential conflicts of interest, managing
the hearing process, fairness and impartiality, determining the facts of a
case and the relevant law, and drafting an award. Such a training program
will enhance the competency of the arbitrators and the confidence of the
parties in the proceedings.
In addition to a comprehensive training program, providing
potential parties with a draft clause to include in their contractual
agreements will provide a clear route to resolution. The following
essential elements must be included in a valid arbitration clause: the
administering institution, the arbitration rules, reference to any dispute
arising out of the agreement, the place (seat) of arbitration, the number of
arbitrators, the method of selection and replacement of arbitrators, the
language of arbitration and the rules of law governing the contract. In
addition to these essential elements, the parties may also consider
including terms such as the allocation of costs, time limits and discovery
considerations.
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See also Shahla F. Ali & John Koon Wang Kwok, After Lehman: International
Response to Financial Disputes—A Focus on Hong Kong, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS.
151, 166–67 (2011) (discussing basic training methods and programs in the mediation
scheme).
87
Shanghai Fayuan Falü Wenshu Jiansuo Zhongxin, supra note 74.
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The authors are of the view that given CIETAC’s limited exposure
to banking and financial sector disputes, in the immediate term, parties are
advised to seek resolution through reference to local financial division
dispute resolution mechanisms such as the financial division of the
Shanghai Courts. In the long term, prospects for greater strengthening of
national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute
Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse.

V. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that China’s systems of financial dispute
resolution and regulation have undergone significant changes since
economic reforms in the late 1990s. The current Chinese regulatory
regime is broadly similar to its United States counterpart, adopting a
traditional sectoral regulatory structure. It comprises the PBC as the
central bank and three sector-specific regulators, namely the CBRC, the
CSRC, and the CIRC responsible for banking, securities and insurance
respectively. Similarly, its financial dispute resolution structures are just
emerging at the provincial level as specialized programs within courts and
arbitral tribunals.
The authors recommend that in the short term, given CIETAC’s
limited exposure to banking and financial sector disputes, parties seek
resolution through reference to local financial division dispute resolution
mechanisms such as the financial division of the Shanghai Courts. In the
long term, prospects for greater strengthening of national mechanisms
such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute Resolution scheme will
provide additional avenues of recourse.

